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Reform in three Phases: -Genesis 
of the West German Federal 
Framework Law for Higher 
Education-1976. 
by 
Joyce M. Mushaben 
Die Staatsgewalt geht vom Volke aus. 
Aber wo geht sie hin? 
-- Bertold Brecht 
For .more than a decade, academic institutions.have been under 
fire. Unlike ihe phoenix, however, the prfncipl~ of university 
autonomy has not emerged unscathed from the ashes of what has been 
labeled a "revolutjon in the relationship of law and ·social pol icy. 111 
As institutions of higher learning become all the more dependent 
upon pub] ic financing throughout advan~ed industrial nations, they 
are steadily befog pulled into their· respective central political-
legal systems. Decisions bearing on the administration as well as 
the substance of higher education have become the domain of state 
legislatures, the federal bureaucracies and lately of the. courts·. 
This work focuses on the manner in which German ·superior courts 
first sought to influence and ultimately came to dominate the 
university reform process du~ing the period of 1965-1979. I argue 
that the judiciary has ·served as the primary veh1c1~ for political 
conflict resolution (or avoidance); in so doing, the constitutional 
and administrative courts have become the single .most important 
element in the university task environm~nt with regard to the process 
of legislative reform. Rulings issued by .the Federal Constitutional 
Court (Bundesverfassungsgeri cht) have ta.ck 1 ed head on the most con- · 
troversial.issues facing German high~r education, including questions 
of admissions criteria, the determination of classroom· 11capacities 11 
ii 
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and acceptable teaching loads, restrictions on the participation 
of faculty, students and staff in declsions on teaching and re-
search, and government supervision of personnel pol icy. · These 
rultngs by educational non-experts have been translated into 
legally codified g~rde1ines for the L~nder governments under ihe 
guise of the 1976 Federal Framework Law for Higher Education 
-
(Hochschulrahmengesetz = HRG). 
Thepaper begins with a general history of the university 
·-reform process, arguing that changes within the German institu-
tions of higher learning over the last ten years have, for the· 
most part, been externally induced. It divides the reform pro-
cess into three stages, 11expa_nsion,l 1 "standardization II and 
rationa-lization, 11 and testifies to a number of major shifts in 
academic reform objectives accompanying each phase. 
~mine the impact of three Federal Constitutional Court 
then ex-
decisions on the reform measures undertaken by German parliamen-
tarians. Finally, I conclude with a summary of reform accomplish-_ 
ments to date, along with a general assessment of the signifi-
cance of judicial activism brought to bear on German higher 
educational politics. 
A. THE SETTING: "HIGH TIME" FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 
Because of its ~tatus as an advanced industrial society, 
the German Federal Republic could be thought to share many of 
the goals of its Western neighbors. Yet in a comparison of 
3 
educat.ional reforms among European Community nations within the 
last two decades, the FRG clearly lagged behind. In 1965, 
~ ' ' 
Torsten Husen maintained that the We.st German educational system· 
served as 11a present day European example of a failure to plan. 112 
. The 11educational catastrophy, 11 first •explored in depth by Georg 
Picht in 1964, was particufarly visible at the tertiary level.3 
Academic institutions continued to be dominated by the kinds of 
hierarchial structures and authoritarian teaching methods that had· 
characterized Ger:man education prior to 1939. Reforms in the areas 
of curricula revision, teacher fraining programs, university 
governance and admissions policies were lon·g overdue. Further, 
despite the post-war commitment to more democratic forms of socio-· 
political organization, the number of students from working class 
families admitted to the universities remained at the level of 
five·to ten percent -- even though enrollments had more than 
doubled by 1965, 
Picht demanded that education be made the nation's number one 
domestic priority for:pedagogical as we.11 as for social and 
economic reasons. First, he. warned that an extreme shortage of 
teachers and classroom facilities was inevitable, in light of the 
additional two mill ion children about to descend upon the country's 
elementary schools -- the first wave of the post-war Baby Boom; 
obviously the qua I ity of education would be seriously impaired if 
existing personnel and classroom space were only to be maintained at 
'i 
4 
existing levels. Secondly, Pkht pointed to significant im-
balances at the L~nder level, owing to the decentralized 
. 
administration of education; school children in. provincial-agri-
cultural regions in ~articula~ were not able to meet even the 
comparatively low-level national standards, and family transfers 
from state to state disadvantaged elem~ntary-aged pupils more 
than their elders. Thirdly, Picht projected the end of Wi.rtschaftswulider. 
In an age of technology and specializati'on, an educational system 
based on 19th.century philosophical prJnciples posed a threat to 
the economic health of society as a whole. Entrance into the 
Common Market and increasing international competition required 
the 11production 11 of ever greater numbers of ski.lled laborers, which 
would hike the price (and the value) of education at all levels. 
The primary fi.nancer in Germany had always been the State; but· 
public investment in education had, in fact, decreased from 3.31 
percent of the national budget in 1958 to 3.26 percent in 1960 and 
2.9 percent in 1962~ Picht placed the blame on the .form of cultural-
educational administration: the L~nder exercised complete control· 
· over legislation and administration, while planning and financing 
powers not specifically delegated in the Basic law-wer~ coveted by 
authorities at the national level. 
ln·J965, sociologi~t Ralf Dahrendorf underscored· Pi~ht's 
analysis of impending doom. Then he introduced another critical 
variable which was to become the bane of university existence,~-
5 
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the notion that Bildung ist Burgerrecht -- education, in the larger 
sense, is a ci~il right. 5 Dahrendorf emphasized that educational 
reform was hot only crucial in regard-to the- nation's·future economic 
and scientific demands, but also in 1 i_ght of changing social needs. 
Affluence~ he argued, was onl~ one dimension of freedom in a 
democratic society. Article-12/1 of the Grundgesetz (the "Baste Law" 
serving ~s the provisional con9titution) guaranteed a11 ~~tizeMs the 
right to choose freely their vocations, educational- facll ities and 
pl aces of work, as did respective artld es in the L~nder stat~tes. · 
The State had no.alternative but to make -Chancengleidiheit --- equal 
opportunity -- the basis of subsequent-educational reforms. In 
_retrospect, it was the introduction of constitutional rights into the 
reform discussion at this early date that unleashed the Furies of 
11Pol iticization 11 and 11 legal ization!' which. have plagued reform efforts 
at the tertiary level for the last ten years, a development to which 
I shall return later on. 
B. PIECEMEAL ENGINEERING: REFORM IN -THREE STJlGES -
_ In principle, the Federal ~epublic's approach to higher educa-
tional reform bears a certain resemblance to what Cyert and March 
have labeled 11problemistic search. 116 - Accepting the judgment -of the 
academic community that the system was_ 11healthy at the core, 11 
university reformers limited themselves initially to making 11marginal 
adjustments" on the alternatives already_ in use.7 By simply broai:fen-
ing.access to existing academic structures, they hoped to ·circumvent 
;; 
6 
the impending shortages prophesied by Picht. 
Under the circumstances, expansion of the tertiary sector was 
a logical first choice in the search for reform alternatives, beglnn-
ing in 1965. Recuperating from the radical reductions of 1933-1939, 
university enrollments returned to normal levels_by 1952; stabiliza- • 
·-
tion was short-lived, however. Institutions of higher learning ex-
perienced a 76 percent increase between 1952 and 1960,: and a further 
enrollment rise of 100 percent during the period 1960-1970. But the 
real "educational explosion" would occur between 1970 and 1975: the 
number of students was to skyrocket an additional 180 percent. 8 
Phase I, 1965 to 1970, saw educational authorities adopt a 
variety of expansion strategies, beginning with the creation of 
eighteen new higher educational institutions. Officials further 
attacked the space problem by expanding the existing un·iversitie.s; 
by transforming specialized institutes into 11 regular11 universities; 
by: adding requirements and then accrediting technical schools with 
higher -educational status; by shifting labs and institutes, as we11-
as other support structures to permit better utilization of avail-
able spaces. -The next step was to swell the rolls of ttie academic 
teaching staff, adding a new stratum of junior faculty (Mittelbau) 
in order to restore student-teacher ratios to- the normal levels of 
the 1950 1 s. In fact, the ranks expanded from 9,000 11assistants11 
in 1960, to-18,000 Jn 1965, to 28,000 by-1971. 9 
These expansion measures produced two unintended results: 1) the 
,; 
7 
increased supply actually exacerbated the d.emand for university 
education in the midst of the baby b?om; and 2) ,rapid.institutional 
growth precipitated internal crises of coordin~ti~n and juthoriti. 
· Federal expenditures to higher education had increased by 500 per-
cent, while control over the allocation of those monies remained 
constitutionally-vested in· the L~nder. In order for the Bund to 
succeed in eff~ctively dist~ibOtJng s~bsldies ~o the L~nder and to 
ensure their use for expansion purposes, federal authorities hel~ 
that it was necessary to simplify their deatiMgs with th~ respective 
recipients~ The mode of universit~~dministration differed sis-
nifican-tly from state to.state, and coordination depended upon 
voluntary compliance by the L~nder. 
Phase II, extending -from 1968 to 1972 was characterized by a 
more active attempt on the part of state officials at both -levels.· 
to direct pressing intraorganizationa1 and interinstitutional 
reforms. StandardJzation was a strategy intended to aid the 
national executive in concentrating and managing-its 11new'assistance 
relationships, 11 while bringing a broad range of conflicting state 
educational priorities more clearly into line wit_h each other and 
with national SPD reform orientations (especially after 1969)~ The 
l~nder viewed standardization as an opportunity for di~tating 
structural -reforms (replacing traditional 11Faculties 11 with depart-
ments), and str~amlining university ad~issions and governance pro-
cedures (switching to a presidential-management system). Authorities 
8 
moreover became conscious of the need to agree on more unified 
academic·programs to facilitate student transfers across state lines 
t 1 .d d .• · . • 10 o ess crow e un1vers1t1es. 
Overcrowding in fact became·~ major problem by 1972,. making 
.it necessary for individual universities to impose.numerical li~ita-
t ions on ·student admissions. Enrollment project ions issued by the 
new Federal Education Ministry of 280,000 for 1978 and 560,000 for 
1980 had been surpassed by 1,60 registrations (291,000) and 1971 
· . 11 
·figures (587,400} respectively. On October 20, 1'972, the eleven 
Ll::nder ministers institutionalized t.he Numerus clausus system by 
cr~ating a Central Office for Student Admissions in Dortmund. The 
. ' 
Numerus clausus principle applied especially to those seeking to 
enroll iri architecture, biology, chemistry, dentistry, medicine, 
pharmacy, psychology and the veterinary sciences. 
Face to face with the brooding giant of finite fiscal resources 
that \I/as conjured up by the recession of 1971-72 and the inflationary 
effects of the 1972-73 energy crisis, the Federal Finance Ministry 
brought university expansion programs to a dramatic halt. Owing to. 
fiscal constraints, educationa.1 authorities were forced to pursue a 
strategy of rationalization, between 1972 and 1976. The. objective 
of this particular reform exercise was to produce~ graduates 
\1/ith higher qualifications in less time at lower~ to concerned 
German taxpayers. T_he L~nd.er ministers of education took advantage 
of the brake on national expansion measures to extend their powers 
9 
with respect to the regulation of examinaitions, and with that, to 
intensify their involvement in the curricular refol'.lll proc;ess. Steps 
to streamline curricula and the impo~ition of tougher exam require-
ments were intended to 1.1depol iticize11 the academic environment, as 
wel_l as to di sci pl ine individual university activists. 
By the end of the 1960 1 s, finance had become the most critical 
aspect of university administration and, consequently, a major source 
. •.. . 11 
of constitutional conflict between the Sund and the Lander. In 1969 
II . 
the Lander were forced to accept a constitutional amendment (91b) that 
extended federal jurisdiction over the higher educational sector in 
exchange for one (91a) that promised significant federal assistance 
• h f ' 1 1 . 1 d . ' 1 d t 12 1n t e areas o agr1cu tura , coasta an reg1ona eve opment. 
Amendment 91"b led to a number of parliamentary acts dealing with 
university construction and federal budg_etary procedures, which in 
turn were to lay groundwork for a natfo~al Higher Education Act. 13 
Federal Educational Minister Leussink presented the first legislative 
draft to parliament in 1971; but by 1972~ political winds had begun 
to shift. While the SPD consolidated its majority in the Bundestag 
following the 1972 national elections, state-level e·lections produced 
a CCU-dominated Bundesrat, thatwas ready, willing and able to 
exercise a suspensive veto against three subsequent drafts of the 
Framework Law. It goes without saying that the German_ university 
was a house divided, owing to the disruptive effects of the anti-
Vietnam protests and the student movement. Sund and L~nder authori-
ties carried their political differences and jurisdictional disp·utes 
10 
Into the halls of parl lament, each hoping to play the role of "the 
state to the rescue." 
The po I It I ca I atmosphere d t d not bode we I I for _the hr gher ed-
cat I on a I system. Two sets of concerns, restoring pol ltlcal order 
and the health of the economy, .figured heavl ly In setting the leg-
ts I at Ive stage for the un Ivers I ty reform b 111 • . Even before the Fed-
era I Ministry had submitted Its first off lclal proposal In 1971, 
legislative debates over developments In the tertiary sector left 
members of par I lament with lfan after taste of something controver-
. 14 
sial, something problematic and of.questfonable_value. 11 Pessi-
mistic from the start, their pol ltlcal dispositions I-ed -German· 
parl lamentarlans to sound the death-knel I tor untverstty autonomy 
-- long before they were to succeed In preparI_ng, revising and pro-
mulg.atlng t~e Framework Law. 
C. JUDICIAL STIMULUS, LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: THE GENESIS 
OF THE HOa-lSCHULAAiMENGESETZ (HRG) 
Reformers h.ad emp I eyed a vart ety of strateg t es, expans ton and 
experimentation, standardization and rational izatton, and st! 11: the 
"university problem" persl·sted. Indeed, by 1970 the higher educa-
tional crisis appeared to have grown much worse.· Technological spe-
cial izatlon was becoming the sine qua non of a stable.Gennan economy, 
Increasing the demands that would be made on the higher educational 
sector. The Sund had sought to expand_ tts framework powers; now It 
would be co_mpel led to use them more extensively, pol itlcs permitting. 
Forced to cede power after the 1969 elections, the Chrisi"tan 
I 
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Democratic Union took Issue with the SPO's slate of soclal reforms 
In genera I · and -en I 1-sted the a Id of the courts ear I y i n 1973 to cha 1-
1 enge the pol lcles of Ostpol ltlk and, later, lndustrlal co-determtn-
atlon, In particular. Lacking an effective pa_r-1 lamentaty majority, 
one might dare to argue, the CCU/CSU came to view the Judicial pro-
cess as Its own channel for "extraparllamentary opposltlon." 15 The 
ut 11 i zat I ori of the Jud I c I a I forum to debate academ I c .refonn quest Ions 
was therefore not unprecedented. 
Since the early 1970's, judicial action In the Federal Republic· 
has Indeed had a significant effect on the governing structures and. 
admissions policies of academlc instltutlons. And there Is evidence 
of a growing tendency in the direction of "Juridical lzation" or 
Verrechtl tchung of questions raised in a variety of pol fey domains. 
Jurtdlcallzatlon Is used here to encompass the·comblned effects of 
legal codification and courtroom Interpretation of parliamentary 
statutes. Jurldical!zatlon, or what others have more broadly labeled 
"polltlclzed-legallsm," Is the process whereby "the constitution Is 
repeatedly Invoked and Its principles elaborated and lnterpreted in 
exhaustive detal I. Such legal Ism channels recurrent conflicts among 
pol ltlcal or Ideological factions- iii many lnstltut-lons." 16 
Historically, the German system of Jurisprudence has been more 
concerned with Interpreting and c;1dherlng to the letter of the law, 
than It has with expounding upon Its spirit •. The court's role has 
. been an Inherently conservative one Cresting on Roman Law), tha-t of 
tes-ttng curren-t practices against the dlcta-tes of Baste Law provisions 
12 
and restrictions. · In recent years, however.,. the courts have cane 
to fol low a course of greater social activism. Iron really enough, 
It Is that other stronghold of conservatism., the COU/CSU, which 
has compel led the judiciary to abandon its old strict-constructron:.. 
1st approach. 
A number of statutes related to civH servfce requirements, 
federal budgetary procedures and, of course, university construc-
tion subsidies promulgated between 1969 and_ 1971 .laid the founda-
tion· for a national Higher Education Act. · The ft.rst legfslative 
•. 
draft presented to parlfamerit in t971 provoked strong partisan 
reaction. The SPD versfon foresaw the Introduction of the compre-
hensive university nationwide, Included provtslons tor currtcular 
and personnel reform, and ac:cepted the principle of Institutional 
self-determfnatfon (Mttbestlmnung) subject to no specific parity 
regulation. Shortly thereafter, the CCU/CSU presented tts own 
draft to the Bundestag~ which contained a radically df fferent ap-
proach to universfty governance and rejected the lmposttfon of the 
"fntegrated"· comprehensive model as the nonn governing ·further ex-
pansion efforts. 
In a landmark decision In 1972~ the Court found that the Nu-· 
merus clausus system devised to meliorate the overcrowding of·es-
pecial ly popular dlscfpl fnes violated the precepts of Art. 12/1 GG. 
· In short, the Numerus clausus rested "on the border of constitu-
tional lty;" I.ts appl I cation was permissible if ·and only ff the ed-
uc:atlonal fact I ity In question could prove that Its departmental. 
. 13 
capactttes were In fact completely exhausted, and untl I such time 
as the legislators succeeded In establ fshtng spectflc, nondtscrlm-
tnatory admissions crlteria or, alternatively,• Tntroduced a "lot-
tery" system. 17 The Court, In essence, challenged federal law-
makers to develop objective and un lvers~1{ ty app I I cab le norms for 
admission decisions, a prerogative that had been exercised solely 
by the unlversfty In former times. The Justices nonethe.less· ex-
. pressed their strong preference for academic achievement, waltfng 
time and "hardship" criteria, affirming the selection procedures 
II : . • . 
i.nfonnal ly agreed upon by the Lander ministers prior to their In-
terstate compact of October, 1972. The.Court also exhorted the 
members of parliament to devise the means for extending university 
capacities. In so doing, the Judiciary establ !shed itself as an 
advocate of university expansion. 
The t l nanc I a I crunch wli I ch . fo-1 I owed In the wake of the 1973-7 4 
recession ultimately curtailed common federal-state efforts to ex-
pand the hlgher·educatlonal system any further. Yet ever more In-
dividuals who had been denied en1'ry, owing to overcrowding, appealed 
to the administrative courts on the basis of their Art. 12/1 rights. 
. 11 d 7 Court action served to expedite Lander reaction, an 19 4 saw an-
other trial effort by the states and the West German Rectors' Con~ 
ference to design a more reliable system for measuring university 
capacities. (Kapazltgtsverordnungen), since. too many of the would-be 
students were actually winning S!! Jure contests. Not that there 
was a great deal of legal loglc to the successes met by Individual 
14 
claimants. At the Admlnlstratlve Court ln Berl In, for examp.le, pe-
' 
tltloners whose last names began with A through K were handed 48 
rejections in the th.I rd chamber, at the same t.lme those with the 
ft rst In It i a Is L to Z came away w I th 57 acceptances fran the four-
teenth Chamber (out of ·60 or so cases); meanwh T le, the -twe I fth · 
. 18 
Chamberspeciallzed In granting "temporary Injunctions." 
The narrow t nterpretat Ions of capac I ty ord I narices . Imposed by 
the administrative judges In the interim not only. gav.e· rlse to a 
whole new breed of lawyers spectallzlng In Numerus clausus cases. 
They also noticeably and 
stead 11 y Increased the teachfog load of each professor 
and teaching assistant. Moreover, by specifying which 
courses must be taught and which are more superfluous 
such t nterpretatlons have -even, for the fl rst time In . 
the history of the German university, systematical ty 
and effectively s_y_bjected to_external controls the .92!!..-
tent of courses /my emphas l,Y. · t 9 
Once again the Administrative Court In Berl ln provides a clas-
sic example. The Judges declared in 1976 that Instead of requiring 
med I ca I students to attend a m In !mum of 32 c I ass hours per semester · 
C the norm set by the natl ona I Assoc I at I on of Med 1·ca I Facu I ty for a 11 
West German institutions, not yet afftrmed by the city-state's Edu-
cation minister), the Free University was to·reduce Its requirement 
to 24 hours of Instruction per semester. 20 · 
In the filial analysts then,-the Judiciary played a direct and 
not inconsequential role In the process of ratlonalizatton for higher 
education, Involving itself In the. detennlnatlon of what are more or 
less cost-effective courses of instruction. 
15 
Unable to implement directly their own strategy for higher ed-
ucational reform, conservattve elements Joined forces to block the 
"democratr clzatlon" tactics of the SPD •. On May 29, 1973, the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court (Buridesverfassungsgerlght.) passed down a 
· deers I on In favor- of 398 p rofessor-s and assoc I ates, who opposed 
the Higher Educational "Pref lmtnary Law" CVorschaltsgesetz) In 
Lower Saxony. The Court ruled that three-way parity In university 
decision-making organs violated the constitutional rights of the 
·senior academic staff members as posited In Art. 5/3 GG, cited 
l~nfra. Moreover, the Court held that these full professors were 
to be guaranteed at least one half of the seats in any body regu-
lattng teaching and examinations (massgebender Einfluss), and. as-
sured a clear majority (ausschlaggebender Einfluss) In matters of 
academic hiring, firing and research (even though tenured full pro-
fessors_ in most institutions were outnumbered at least two or three 
to one by junior faculty and 1-ecturers charged with primary aca-
d_emtc functions). Consequently, It was the Constltutlonal Court 
which tock the first critical step In the standardtzatton of uni-
versity governance: by recogn !zing In prlnclp le the need for rep-
resentation of al I groups directly affected- by academic decisions 
In central university organs, at the same time I lmiting propo~-
ttonately the amount of tnfluence each of these groups could bring 
to bear on final decision according to their level of "qua! lftca-
tton."21 
Whereas the Numerus ct ausus ru I t ngs had effect of "throw Ing 
.: 
16 
university to the wolves" on case-by-case basts, the Impact of the 
Group University dectston was Immediate and unlversal. Berl In leg-·· 
lslators., who had announced In January 1973 that there would be no 
major amendments to their Higher Education Act prior to the su~er 
of 1975, were the fti-st to rallroad through the legtslature an Ad-
aptat I on Law s I gn 1.f i cant I y a I ter T ng the proport Iona I compos It I on 
of un Ivers I ty dee! slon-makl ng organs on November 19, 1973. 22· 
Another const!tutlonaJ paradox awaited court resolution In 1975. 
Article 5/~ GG asserts:. 
Art and science, research and teaching shal I be free. Free-· 
dom of teach Ing sha 11 not abso Ive from I oya I ty to the con-
st ! tut I on. · 
In January, 1972, Chancel I.or Brandt joined the heads of the lJtn-
der governments fn formulating guide! Ines with respect to the publ le 
employment of right and left wing radicals CExtremlstenbeschluss of 
February 18, 1972). This ordinance was to subject civil service 
candidates to "const!tutlonal loyalty" checks., prior to granting. 
tenure. Academics were Included_ In light of their classification 
as clvi I servanfs. Instead of checking personal histories only in 
cases where "evidence" was already known to exist, the exception 
qutckly became the rule. Between 1973-1975, the state-level "con-
stlfutlonal protection office" in Berlin CLandeskommlsslon) had 
received 24,000 "lnquires'' and was able to provide "evldence" in 
1,800 cases, 93 of which actually resulted In Tndlviduals being 
barred from pub I le employmen-r. In Savaria the figures were 55,000 






On May 22, 1975, the justices in_ Karlsruhe proclaimed· that 
even those working for the state on a t:rlal or ·provisional basts 
must submit to a test of their loyalty (medical and legal Interns). 
The Constitutional Court decreed: 
The pol ltlcal loyalty ·ob.I lgatlon requires mor'= than Just 
a forma 11 y correct, but otherw I se disinterested., coo I , 
Internally-distant posture toward the state and the Con-
stitution; It demands of the civl I servant In partlcular 
that he clearly distance hlm~elf from groups and endeav-
ors whl.ch attack, oppose· and defame this state, Its con-
stltutl.Q.nal ly created organs and the val ld constitutional 
order Lmy emphasis/.- 24 
One presumes that court Itself wt 11 eventual .ly have to. judge what 
constitutes academic discourse on alternative polTtlcal ideologies, 
free polltlcal expression or a cool, distant posture towards the 
existing German "stai"e." 
In I lght of these developments, It ts clear that the exten-
sion of "pol itlclzed legal Ism" Into the domain of educational, re-
form pol Icy has created the conditions under_ which the Judlcial 
branch of government emerges as the pub I l c' s veh l c I e for po I it I ca I 
confl let resolution In the FRG. Legislators are exhorted, even 
admonished, to produce thelr own solutlons, but nonetheless find 
th~ range of pol Icy alternatives narrowed with each new set of ju ... 
dlclal decl_sions. This trend, frqm my perspective_, sugges-ts a 
certain parallel to the decreasing administrative "elbow room" 
afforded the universities In the management of academic affairs. 
The lnsi'ltutlons of higher learning were ordered to reform them-
selves, whl le ~nder Interference made self-reorganization fir-si' 
dtfflcult, later Impossible. The courts In turn called the law-
18 
makers to task for not provtdl-ng quick and effective soluttons to 
· un Ivers i ty overcrowd Ing, wh I I e de I t neat frig areas In wh t ch the par-
1 t ament would no longer be free to conduct.an expertmental or prob-
I emf sttc search •. 
Bad. enough that the legislators were obi !gated to adhere to a 
number of proscrip:tlcns conta lned. In the Constitutiona·I Court 
rulings; equally harmful to the concept of university autonomy was 
the.fact that subsequent drafts of the Fra~work Law followed what 
were essentially pollttcal prescriptions appearing In the Justices' 
opinions accompanying the declstons. Their argumentations have 
become "ever I onger and ever more fundamenta I," ranging from 55 
pages in the 1972 Numerus clausus case, to 99 pages on the Group 
University, to a 109 page exegesis regarding .a 1977 Numerus clausus 
verdlct. 25 From-the perspective of untverslty observers, the draft 
proposal had an Immediately negative Impact., tn that the polttlcal 
nature of the debates did more to "divide and conquer" proponents 
of more rad I ca I reform a I ternat l ves, than t t. d rd to p remote adm In-
t strative effectiveness. Worst of all, perhaps, was the fact that 
the HRG not only premised to alter substantially the structure of 
.· 
university governance, thereby disregarding the prfnclple of ln-
stltutlona I sel f-determrnatlon. It threatened at .the same time to 
leave other critical dimensions of university activity, such as cur..: 
rtcular reform and regulation of examination contents, open to the 
. " di scret ton of the Lander, those who had been reca I c i trant reformers 
t n the f i rst p I ace.-
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By 1976, the passage of the Framework Law had become a pol lt-
lca I end In Itself, rather than a means to a more effectlve system 
. of hlgher learning - a classlc case of goal displacement, e~pe-
. cl a 11 y on the part of the SPO, under much pressure from Its own 
left wing, on the one hand, and COU/CSU forces, on the other. Mem-
bers of the academic community In al I of the Ll!nder sharply critt-
c I zed the process as we I I as the product of f Ive years of education-
a 1-1 eg Is I at Ive activity. · In this author's estlmatlon, the promul-
gatlon of the Hochschulrahmengesetz bolls down to a struggle between 
federal and state-level authorities, a Jurlsdictlonal dispute exac-
erbated by opposing party-pol itlcal configurations at these two · 
levels and arbitrated by a supposedly non-pol ltlcal Judiciary. The 
HRG became law on January 29, 1976, not because It promised ariy 
particularly outstanding advantages for the higher educational sys-
. tem, but because pol !ti clans -- because they are pol itlclans --
needed to attend to other important business that had been postponed 
In the struggles over the HRG. 
D. CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL ACTION ANO .REFORM ACHIEVEMENTS. 
The "high priests at Karlsruhe" have undeniably coritrtbuted·to 
the Inst I tut Iona I I zatl on of what were suppose to be tempera ry, rT emer-
gency" procedures. Paragraph §3 HRG, which refers to the protection 
of academic freedom, contains elements of the Bundesverfassungsgerlcht's 
Radical Ordlnance Judgment of 1975. The sections on universlty admis-
sions, §27-35 HRG, bear a very strong resemblance to the Consi"itutlonal 
Court's Numerus clausus ruling ·of 1972. §38 HRG dlrectly incorporates 
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the precepts la,td down tn the Group University verdict of 1979. 
On October 23, 1976 the justices declared §32, Section 3/2 HRG 
(deal-Ing wltli waiting periods for admissions) null and void. 
They also susp.ended temporart ly §35 HRG, which divorces appttca-
tlons and chances for admission trom one's place of residence. 
One legal critic has label led the terminology and the textual.·_ -
_- . . u 
out I Ina of the Framework Law an exercise in "Karlsruhe-clzatlon." 
Judlclal efforts to resolve conf I lets between the Sund and 
" . . 
the Lander, SPD and CDLI fact I ens, po 11 t I c i ans and bureaucrats are 
not without pol ltlcal· costs. The solutions advanced by the Judi-
e la I branch are temporary_ at best; every· act of -Interpretation, 
every textual exegesis produces new elements of law. Each de-
cision tends to breed Its own brand of confl let In new areas, not 
to mention the manner In whlch 1t·contrfbutes appreciably to the _ 
Coul'"t's own workload. As the dissenting Justtces tn the Group· 
Unlve,:-sity case shrewdly warned in 1973, the judiciary has been 
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captured by the lrreverslbI I tty of Its own decisions. - The 
carved-In-stone character of Constitutional Court rulings means, 
on the one hand,that Judlctal actors have become the recognized 
managers of an Inter-dependence which they In part have helped to 
create. The other side of the coin Is that academic Institutions 
In the 'Federal Repub I le have been deprived permaneni"ly of the right 
to establish primary educational goals and to determine the besi" 
means of achieving those goals, which ostensibly poses the greatest 







ln the _FRG. · Pol ltlclzed legal tsm ultimately I fmlts the types of 
adjustments untversttles will be able to make, should new socio-
economic contingencies arise • 
Th Is cone I us r on rests r n part on a number of t nterv I ews 
conducted with persons who were Involved In all phases of the 
legislative process - actors ranging from members of competing 
party factions to cff lclals at the mlntsterlal level, not to 
mention those most directly affected by the legislative flurry, 
the academic employees. The only common reaction volced by these 
diverse groups was a hlgh degree of dlssatisfatlon. The HRG, 
they malntained, was clearly a case where a bad compromise was 
conceivably better than no compromise at al I. The lawmakers 
" among them openly admitted that von Unfy_ersJtatsautonomi e l st 
nle die Rede gewesen - university autonomy was never a topic 
of real dlscusslon. Few of _the university groups were directly 
or regularly consulted over a longer period of time. Few of the 
legislators were In a posltlon to ldentlfy strongly wlth the con~ 
cept of unlverslty autonomy, slnce their primary concern centered 
on short-term politlcal accountabl llty. 
The Federal Framework Law for Higher Education fn· Its pres-
ent form, and the spectrum of State Adaptation Laws promulgated 
- - - - - -- -
ln its wake, do not appear to offer a more 1-ong tastlng resolutlo,n 
of tensions, nor a necessarl ly durable pol ltlcal consensus on role 





the FRG. Then what has been accomp I ished durl ng 15 years· of (what 
critics label) the "re.form hectic?" 
In one respect, the reform has taken hold: · the expanslon pro-
grams begun In the late sixties have slgntflcantfy broadened citi-
zen access to h lgher education -~ · if you don't ml nd the wa It, that 
is. Waiting periods of three to seven years continue to plague 
appl tcants looking for a place In the.hardcore Numerus clausus dls-
clpl Ines. The number of students enrol led In the tertiary sector 
has risen lmpresslvly from some 373,000 in 1965 to 788,000 In 1974 
and to more than 978,000 in 1978/79.28 The percentage of a gl~en 
cohort now attending academic institutions has also jumped frcm 
less than six percent in 1965 to roughly twenty percent by 1979. 
Reformers have furthermore brought about a measure of stan-
, dardlzatlon with regard to university administration and degree 
requlrements;.but the beauty·of this Important .reform accompllsh-
ment appears to be only skin deep. Substantive as wet I as pol ltl-
cal differences persist· fr,om one state to ·another, especlally- In 
relation to the teacher training and recruitment practices which 
rema In under the contra I of the Lgnder m In I sters. The HRG d Id what 
It was supposed to do In a limited sense, viz. it provided state--
level pol Icy-makers with a corr.men legal framework •. But a closer 
look at the eleven Adaptation Laws leads one to conclude that the 
Framework Law ls about as effective In covering up the differences 
" ' In Lander educational priorities as were the emperor's new clothes 
In protecting the sovereign from unfavorable environmental elements. 
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The regulations have become more and more detailed with each legal 
. . 
turn; the distinctions between qualiftcattons, extrafunctlonal and 
otherwise, are more and more acute. " Some of the Lander a I I ow for 
organs of student government; others, such as BavarT a.,· have out ... 
lawed them·. Some states guarant.ee the lega·I maximum In assigning 
representational seats to non-professorial groups, other- hold par-
. . . . . . 29 
tlclpatlon In dectslon-maklng· bodies to -minimal levels. Ultimately, 
the standardization of academic programs wi 11 depend upon the coop-
eratlve efforts and compromise agreements worked out by_ the regional 
curr I cu I ar reform comm I sslorts, whose members have on I y begun to -tack I e 
the task at hand. 
Rationalization, that is, the attempt to ensure Job-relevant 
training and a degree of professional f lexlbl I lty; whl le simultaneously 
stream! lhlng curriculum., accelerating the learning process and holdlng 
down costs, Is an objective that can only be attained through the 
clever use of mirrors. Pol ltlclzation of the university reform Issue 
has led to greater external control over the cpntent of hfgher learn-
t ng, and. assessments by outs r de agents are t ncreas Ing ly based on eco-
nan i c er i ter la. Ratlona I I zat l on measures may assist po I t t l ca I author-
1 t I es In deallng with the question of institutional efficiency; but 
moves In this direction ought not to be equated with educational ef-
. fec1-lveness. Successful rational lza1-fon wou-ld stgnlfy-1-hat tang Ible 
benefits have accrued to lndlv.lduals participating In _the accelera-ted 
learning process as a direct consequence of leglslatlve reform activ-
ity. Present academic unemployment statistics In the Federal Republ le 
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bel Je the benef Its of mass education for mass education's sake. · 
Rat i ona 11 zat I on, t n many respects,· h·as fa 11 ed to ser-v f ce reform 
· object! ves. 
It ls highly uni ikely that officials in ·t.he Federal Republic 
wlll Jump at the chance to engage In a process of "rolling reforms." 
What German politician would be wllllng to reopen this leglslatlve 
Pandora I s box on a regu I ar I zed. bas.Is? My susp i c Ion Is that the 
academic lhstitutlons themselves would wind up worse for the wear 
and tear, as each success Ive package of regu I at Ions Is more bureau.;. 
cratlcal ly and legally binding than the one that went before. Ap-
peals to the Judlclary In rr.atters of higher educational pol !tics 
have become more or less standard operating procedure In the Ger-
man Federa I Repub If c, but Jurl d ica I responses ·per.§.!. do not guar-
antee that cooperation and coordlnatlon. wt 11 ensue among competlng 
partisan groups. The "un-iverslty problem" ls In fact symptomatic 
of more fundamental social and polltlcal cleavages. At the basis 
of the "educational catastrophe" was a recognition that advanced 
I ndustr ta I Germany has become a very comp I ex, · Interdependent soc i-
ety whose problems require col lectlve solutions. Whether the Sund 
or the l.Snder ought to dominate the educatl ona I po I 1 cy process is. 
no longer the Issue. Much more serious questions arise regarding 
the Judlclary 1s own instltutio_nal mandate to place constli'utlonal 
rights above pol ltlcai imperatives. In responding directly to Ju-
dicial s-tlmul I, legislators have fa! !en prey to a new double bind: 
they have lnadvertantly provided encouragement to citizens, who 
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seek to guarantee the practice of lndlvldual rights through the 
courts, and the Courts' prescriptions then serve as the basis 
for growing restrictions on the freedom of the whole, beyond 
the rea Im of academ I cs •. 
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